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OPINION 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 
Nicholas Knopick (“Knopick”) appeals the District 
Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania‟s grant of 
summary judgment for Appellee Philip Downey (“Downey”), 
Esquire, on Knopick‟s legal malpractice tort and contract 
claims against Downey.  Knopick claims that Downey 
committed malpractice in failing to prosecute a legal 
malpractice action on Knopick‟s behalf against John 
Connelly, Jr., Esquire, Susan M. Kadel, Esquire, and their law 
firm James, Smith, Durkin & Connelly, L.L.P. (“Connelly 
Defendants”).   
Knopick argues that the District Court should not have 
applied the occurrence rule to determine the start date of the 
statute of limitations for his claim against the Connelly 
Defendants; instead, the Court should have tolled the statute 
of limitations based on the discovery rule or fraudulent 
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concealment doctrine.  Knopick also argues that even 
applying the occurrence rule, the District Court erred in its 
ruling because he and Downey had entered into an attorney-
client relationship before the statute of limitations had run. 
We find that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Downey based on its 
application of the occurrence rule to Knopick‟s underlying 
claim against the Connelly Defendants.  We will apply the 
discovery rule to Knopick‟s underlying claim and we 
subsequently find a genuine issue of fact as to when Knopick 
should have known of his injury and its cause under the 
discovery rule.  We will reverse the decision of the District 
Court and remand Knopick‟s case for further proceedings, in 
accordance with this opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND
1
 
On May 11, 1998, Knopick, a commercial pilot, and 
his wife, Darlene Knopick (“Dolly”), entered into a 
Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA” or the 
“Agreement”) whereby Dolly would receive $60,000 from 
Knopick‟s retirement plan.  In July 1999, Knopick filed for 
divorce.
 
 Dolly filed a motion to set aside the Agreement and 
to hold an equitable distribution hearing for the property.  In 
the motion, she alleged that Knopick failed to disclose all of 
his stock investments at the time they entered into the 
Agreement.  Specifically, she was unaware of two million 
dollars worth of stock that Knopick held.   Knopick 
maintained that at the time of the Agreement, Dolly was fully 
aware of all of his assets, including the two million dollars 
worth of stock.  In any case, the stock was encumbered by a 
two million dollar loan.   
                                                 
1
 We draw these facts from the record, viewing them in light 
most favorable to Knopick.   See Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 
F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Knopick retained the Connelly Defendants in 2004 to 
represent him in the matter.  The Connelly Defendants told 
Knopick that the Agreement was valid, and that if it were set 
aside, he would only have to pay Dolly the amount that the 
stock was worth at the time he entered into the Agreement.  
On August 2, 2004, a PSA hearing was held before Judge 
Kathy A. Morrow in the Court of Common Pleas in Perry 
County, Pennsylvania, to determine whether Dolly was 
provided with full disclosure of Knopick‟s assets in 1998.     
 Before the hearing, Knopick told Connelly of four 
witnesses who could testify as to Dolly‟s knowledge of his 
assets at the time he entered into the PSA.  The witnesses on 
the list were Dolly‟s lawyer, Carl Wass; Knopick‟s lawyer, 
Michael Hanft; the couple‟s accountant, Charles (“Chuck”) 
Pegg; and his wife, Becky Pegg.  Knopick claims that 
Connelly represented that he would contact the witnesses on 
the list, including Wall, Chuck Pegg, and Hanft.  Prior to the 
PSA hearing, Dolly offered to settle the case, if Knopick 
would transfer $300,000 of his UPS stock to her.  Based on 
advice from Connelly and Kadel, including Kadel‟s 
indication that they had a lot of evidence including tax 
returns, Knopick rejected the offer.      
Neither Kadel nor Connelly met with Knopick prior to 
the hearing.  On August 2, 2004, the date of the hearing, 
Knopick was informed that Kadel, not Connelly—whom he 
had expected to appear on his behalf—would represent him at 
the hearing.  Kadel did not call any of the witnesses that 
Knopick had recommended.  Kadel told Knopick that 
Connelly did not need to be there, that the other witnesses 
were not necessary because of the tax records, and that the 
Agreement would not be set aside.   
In fact, only Knopick testified on his own behalf.  
Knopick denied committing any fraud or concealing his 
assets.  He testified that Dolly was aware of the value of his 
stock and that she had access to all of his financial statements.  
He further stated that Dolly had access to his financial 
information each year when they prepared their joint tax 
returns with their accountant, Mr. Pegg.   
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Dolly and her sister, Carol Ann Chaft, testified on 
Dolly‟s behalf.  Dolly testified that Knopick had acted 
fraudulently and had failed to disclose his assets.  Dolly 
claimed that she thought Knopick only had a small amount of 
stocks and that she did not know their value.  Dolly asserted 
that Knopick and Pegg did not share Knopick‟s financial 
information with her when they did the couple‟s taxes.  She 
also testified that, at the time, she believed Mr. Hanft to be 
their family attorney.  She professed that she never consulted 
with Wass about Knopick‟s assets before signing the 
Agreement.   
 After the hearing, Kadel told Knopick that it had gone 
well.  Connelly told Knopick later that the hearing “was not a 
big deal and that any competent attorney could handle it.”  
(App. at 476.)  Over the next few months when Knopick 
spoke to Connelly and Kadel, they told him that there was 
nothing to worry about, and assured him that the hearing had 
gone well.  On July 7, 2005,
2
 the Court decided the matter in 
Dolly‟s favor, setting aside the Agreement in order to subject 
Knopick‟s assets to an equitable distribution hearing.  
Knopick claims that at that point, Kadel and Connelly told 
him that an appeal was in the works.
3
  Shortly thereafter, 
Knopick discharged the Connelly Defendants because of how 
Connelly had handled the custody aspect of the case.  At that 
point, Knopick hired attorney Rich Wagner to represent him, 
and claims that only after Wagner reviewed the case did he 
come to believe that Connelly and Kadel may have been 
negligent.   
                                                 
2
 The state court order refers to the date as July 5, 2005, 
however in his brief, Knopick claims that the date of Judge 
Morrow‟s Order was July 7, 2005, when it was stamped and 
placed on the docket.  Downey uses the same date of July 7, 
2005 in his brief in response and at oral argument, although 
he used the date of July 5, 2005 in his original complaint.  For 
the purposes of this appeal and because it does not affect our 
decision, we will refer to the date of the order as July 7, 2005. 
3
 Knopick settled the matter in early 2007 by agreeing to pay 
Dolly $1,800,000.   
6 
 
 On July 28, 2006,
4
 Knopick first met with Mr. 
Downey, who had been recommended to him, to discuss 
bringing a malpractice action against the Connelly 
Defendants for their representation of him in the PSA matter.
5
  
On August 9, 2006, at Downey‟s direction, Downey and 
Knopick met with attorney Albert Momjian, whom Downey 
identified as an expert in domestic relations cases.  After their 
meeting, Downey met with Knopick several times and told 
Knopick that he had a good malpractice case.  Downey also 
told Knopick that he had retained an expert and was filing suit 
on Knopick‟s behalf.   
On October 26, 2006, Downey sent a letter to the 
Connelly Defendants stating, in part,  the following:   
Having reviewed the hearing 
transcript, it does appear that your 
firm was negligent in failing to 
present both testimonial and 
documentary evidence, and for 
repeatedly failing to object to 
improper testimony by Darlene 
Knopick and questioning by her 
attorney. 
The evidence and objections in 
question, were of sufficient 
                                                 
4
 Downey claims that this meeting took place on July 30, 
2006.  Because the two-day discrepancy is of no moment in 
our decision, we need not resolve it. 
5
 On appeal, Knopick claims that even if the occurrence rule 
applies, his attorney-client relationship with Downey for the 
Connelly Defendants malpractice matter started as early as 
the date of this first meeting, on July 28, 2006, before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations under the occurrence 
rule.  Downey claims that by failing to raise it below, 
Knopick has waived this argument.  Because we will reverse 
the District Court‟s ruling on other grounds, we do not reach 
this argument.   
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weight that they very likely would 
have resulted in a different 
outcome. . . . At this juncture we 
do not know Mr. Knopick‟s exact 
monetary loss as a result of your 
firm‟s apparent malpractice; 
however, it seems almost certain 
that it will exceed one million 
dollars ($1,000,000), and could 
well be in the vicinity of fifteen 
million dollars ($15,000,000). 
Please place your carrier on notice 
of this potential claim. The statute 
of limitations on this matter, in 
tort, is July 5, 2007, [two years 
after the date of Judge Morrow‟s 
Order invalidating the Property 
Settlement Agreement]. 
(App. at 523.)  On March 30, 2007, five months later, 
Downey asked Knopick to sign an official agreement to file 
suit on the malpractice claim, which Knopick did.  However, 
Downey did not file the lawsuit.   
On February 25, 2008, Downey sent Knopick a letter 
terminating his representation.  Knopick claims that until this 
time, Downey repeatedly told him that he had a good case.  
The letter stated that the two-year statute of limitations on his 
claim against the Connelly Defendants had begun to run from 
the date of the August 2, 2004 hearing when the firm failed to 
call potentially relevant witnesses, and had expired on August 
2, 2006, prior to Downey‟s representation of Knopick.6  
                                                 
6
 Although it is somewhat unclear from the record and oral 
argument what transpired during the time between the signing 
of the representation agreement and Downey‟s termination 
letter, it is clear from the October 2006 letter that Downey 
believed, or at least represented, at one time, that the statute 
of limitations did not begin to run until the court‟s July order, 
and that he intended at that time, to bring the action in tort.  
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On July 6, 2009, Knopick filed suit against the 
Connelly Defendants, claiming legal malpractice under a 
breach of contract theory.  In that complaint, Knopick also 
brought claims against Downey, alleging legal malpractice 
under both tort and contract theories of liability.  On July 22, 
2009, the Connelly Defendants moved to dismiss Knopick‟s 
claim against them.  On December 29, 2009, the District 
Court granted this motion.  It found that Knopick‟s claim 
against the Connelly Defendants was grounded in tort, not 
contract.  The tort claim was thus subject to a two-year statute 
of limitations which had run, with regard to Knopick‟s claims 
against them, regardless of the start date of the statute of 
limitations, an issue which the Court explicitly did not decide.  
Knopick v. Connelly, Civil No. 09-1287, 2009 WL 5214975, 
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2009).  Knopick did not file a timely 
appeal of that ruling.   
On October 21, 2009, Downey filed a motion for 
summary judgment on Knopick‟s claims against him.  The 
District Court granted the motion on January 25, 2010.
 
 In his 
motion, Downey argued that Knopick‟s claims must fail 
because Downey and the Connelly Defendants did not cause 
Knopick to suffer economic damages and because the PSA 
was the product of Knopick‟s own fraud.  In a footnote, 
Downey noted that if Knopick‟s claims survived summary 
judgment, a critical factor in determining his tort claim would 
be when the applicable statute of limitations began to run—at 
the August 2004 hearing or at the time of Knopick‟s notice of 
the state court‟s July 2005 order.  Knopick addressed the 
statute of limitations argument in his brief in response, 
claiming that the statute did not commence until the court‟s 
order, and that Downey, whom he retained in March 2007, 
was therefore retained within the two-year tort statute of 
limitations.   
                                                                                                             
Thus, Downey‟s assertion at oral argument before this Court 
that he believed the potential claim against the Connelly 
Defendants was based in contract and that the statute of 
limitations on that claim started at the August 2, 2004 hearing 
is not credible.   
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The District Court granted Downey‟s motion for 
summary judgment on Knopick‟s tort claim on the statute of 
limitations ground,
7
 finding that the occurrence rule applied 
to start the statute on the date of hearing (August 2, 2004).  
The Court also found that although the parties made 
numerous potentially meritorious arguments, the statute of 
limitations on Knopick‟s claims had run by the time he 
retained Downey for the malpractice claim.  This was 
devastating to Knopick‟s claim that Downey committed 
malpractice by not filing a claim against the Connelly 
Defendants.  In so finding, the Court determined that 
Pennsylvania‟s discovery rule did not toll the start of the 
statute of limitations.  The Court also granted summary 
judgment on Knopick‟s contract claim for legal malpractice 
against Downey, finding that the claim was actually grounded 
in tort.
 8
   The District Court did not reach Downey‟s other 
arguments for summary judgment because of its dispositive 
statute of limitations determination.  Knopick appeals the 
District Court‟s order.    
                                                 
7
 A tort claim for legal malpractice in Pennsylvania requires 
the following: 
(1) the employment of the 
attorney or other basis for a duty; 
(2) the failure of the attorney to 
exercise ordinary skill and 
knowledge; and (3) that such 
failure was the proximate cause of 
damage to the plaintiff.   
Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 112 (Pa. 1993).  Because the 
Court found that the statute of limitations for Knopick‟s claim 
against the Connelly Defendants had already run when 
Knopick retained Downey, it found that Knopick could not 
have met part two of a tort claim because Downey acted as a 
reasonable attorney would have under the circumstances in 
not bringing an expired claim.   
8
 Knopick acknowledged at oral argument that he has 
abandoned his contract claim.   
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II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332, due to diversity of citizenship of the parties.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s 
grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard of 
whether genuine issues as to material fact exist such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128 
(3d Cir. 2003).  We must “view the record and draw 
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  
In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
State tolling principles “are generally to be used by a 
federal court when it is applying a state limitations period;” 
therefore, we look to Pennsylvania law, predicting how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve the statute of 
limitations issue.  Debiec, 352 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); Jewelcor, Inc. v. Karfunkel, 517 
F.3d 672, 676 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008).  “When ascertaining 
Pennsylvania law, the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court are the authoritative source.”  Spence v. ESAB Group, 
Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  When making a 
prediction as to how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
rule, we “must look to decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts, of federal courts interpreting that state‟s law, 
and of other state supreme courts that have addressed the 
issue,” among other sources.  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 
F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008)).     
Pennsylvania imposes a two-year statute of limitations 
on tortious conduct, including legal malpractice actions.  42 
Pa. C.S.A. § 5524.  Pennsylvania favors strict application of 
statutes of limitations.  Glenbrook Leasing Co. v. Beausang, 
839 A.2d 437, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal granted in 
part, 870 A.2d 318 (Pa. 2005) and order aff'd without 
11 
 
opinion, 881 A.2d 1266 (Pa. 2005).  “Whether the statute has 
run on a claim is usually a question of law for the trial judge, 
but where the issue involves a factual determination, the 
determination is for the jury.”  Foulke v. Dugan, 187 F. Supp. 
2d 253, 258-59 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting Hayward v. Med. 
Ctr. of Beaver Cnty., 608 A.2d 1040 (Pa. 1992)).   
The trigger for the accrual of a legal malpractice action 
is not the realization of actual loss, but the occurrence of a 
breach of duty.  Wachovia Bank, M.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 
565, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).   Under the occurrence rule, 
“the statutory period commences upon the happening of the 
alleged breach of duty.”  Id. at 572 (quoting Robbins & 
Seventko Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. Geisenberger, 674 
A.2d 244, 246-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).  Where a plaintiff 
could not reasonably have discovered his injury or its cause, 
however, Pennsylvania courts have applied the discovery rule 
to toll the statute of limitations.  Wachovia, 935 A.2d at 572-
74 (citing Pocono Int‟l Raceway v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 
A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983)).  Where the discovery rule does 
apply, the two-year period on legal malpractice actions begins 
to run where the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known of the injury and its 
cause.  Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 
2000). 
Knopick argues that instead of the occurrence rule, the 
Court should have applied the discovery rule in deciding the 
statute of limitations issue on his claim against the Connelly 
Defendants.  Alternatively, Knopick argues that the Connelly 
Defendants would have been equitably estopped from 
asserting a statute of limitations defense based on the doctrine 
of fraudulent concealment.
9
  Fraudulent concealment would 
                                                 
9
 Unlike Downey‟s assertion at oral argument, Pennsylvania 
common law does not hold that an exception to application of 
the occurrence rule requires fraud or concealment.  Though 
fraud or concealment may be a factor in determining whether 
the discovery rule applies, they are not necessary to its 
application.  To the extent that Downey alludes to the 
separate doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which may also 
12 
 
also toll the start of the statute of limitations on Knopick‟s 
malpractice claim until he reasonably should have been aware 
of his injury and its cause.
10
  See Fine, 870 A.2d at 861. 
The discovery rule is historically “grounded on 
considerations of basic fairness.”  Taylor v. Tukanowicz, 435 
A.2d 181, 183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (citing Ayers v. Morgan, 
154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959)).  It was first enunciated by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a coal conversion action 
where the subsurface injury, defendant‟s removal of coal 
from plaintiff‟s property, was unknown to the plaintiff.  The 
analysis focused on “the inability of the plaintiff, despite the 
exercise of diligence, to know of the trespass.”  Pocono, 468 
A.2d at 471.  This tolled the running of the statute, for “no 
amount of vigilance w[ould] enable him to detect the 
approach of a trespasser who may be working his way 
through the coal seams underlying adjoining lands.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewey v. H.C. 
Fricke Coke Co., 31 A. 261, 263-64 (Pa. 1895)) (“He cannot 
reasonably be required to act until knowledge that action is 
needed is possible to him. We are disposed to hold, therefore, 
that the statute runs against an injury committed in or to a 
                                                                                                             
be used to toll the statute of limitations, it requires the 
presence of clear or unequivocal evidence of “unintentional 
or intentional” fraud or concealment.  See Fine v. Checcio, 
870 A.2d 850, 860 (Pa. 2005). 
10
 Plaintiffs often raise these two doctrines as alternative 
grounds for tolling.  Indeed, we have described the 
Pennsylvania courts‟ development of the doctrine of 
fraudulent concealment “[a]s a corollary to the discovery 
rule.”  Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(finding that the inquiry under the fraudulent concealment 
doctrine is the same as that under the discovery rule).  As the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Fine, “the standard of 
reasonable diligence, which is applied to the running of the 
statute of limitations when tolled under the discovery rule, 
should also apply when tolling takes place under the doctrine 
of fraudulent concealment.”  870 A.2d at 861.   
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lower stratum from the time of actual discovery, or the time 
when discovery was reasonably possible.”).    
Subsequently, the rule was principally applied in 
medical malpractice cases, notably one that involved the 
failure of a surgeon to remove a sponge after surgery.  Ayers, 
154 A.2d at 788 (citing Lewey, 31 A. at 261).  The discovery 
rule was implicated based on the inability of the plaintiff to 
ascertain the presence of the sponge.  This “prevent[ed] the 
commencement of the running of the statute, for „[c]ertainly 
he could not open his abdomen like a door and look in; 
certainly he would need to have medical advice and 
counsel.‟”  Pocono, 468 A.2d at 472 (quoting Ayers, 154 
A.2d at 792).  In Ayers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court‟s summary judgment order starting 
the statute of limitations at the time of surgery when the 
sponge was left in plaintiff‟s abdomen.   
Pennsylvania courts have since applied the discovery 
rule to other types of actions under the same principle.  See 
Anthony v. Koppers Co., Inc., 425 A.2d 428, 436 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 436 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1981).     
We also look to our Circuit‟s pronouncements 
regarding Pennsylvania‟s discovery rule in the context of 
medical malpractice and physical tort claims.  We have found 
that the rule is “designed to „ameliorate the sometimes-harsh 
effects of the statute of limitations,‟ and it is often applied in 
medical malpractice and latent disease cases in which the 
plaintiff is unable to discover his or her injury until several 
years after the tort occurred.”  Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 
502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding material issue of fact as to 
whether plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence in 
determining cause of their cows‟ illness where plaintiffs 
relied on experts‟ advice and defendant‟s representation that 
its emissions from industrial facility were harmless) (citing 
Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984)); see also Bohus, 950 F.2d at 919 (finding 
either discovery rule or fraudulent concealment tolled 
limitations period and evidence supported jury‟s conclusion 
that patient could not have discovered the cause of her 
injuries subsequent to bunion surgery until she consulted an 
14 
 
orthopedic surgeon where original doctor assured her that the 
pain was result of normal healing process and plaintiff 
consulted other physicians who confirmed prognosis).
11
   
The common thread in the discovery rule‟s application 
in medical malpractice cases is that a plaintiff suffers a 
physical ailment after undergoing treatment from a doctor, 
but is unaware of the subsequent injury at the time of the 
later-alleged breach of duty.  Specifically, the symptoms have 
not yet become apparent or the symptoms experienced up 
until that time are presumed to be normal.  Until the plaintiff 
experiences abnormal symptoms, or the abnormal condition 
                                                 
11
 See also Miller v. Philadelphia Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266 
(3d Cir. 2006) (applying discovery rule in Pennsylvania 
survival and wrongful death claim where question remained 
whether decedent with mental age of a four-year old knew or 
was capable of knowing that he was injured and the cause of 
his injury); Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 
2005) (noting that where a person is given an incorrect 
diagnosis and may be misdirected to injury‟s cause, statute of 
limitations might not begin until they are given the correct 
diagnosis or should otherwise know the true cause in light of 
totality of the circumstances); O‟Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 
F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding under the discovery rule that 
if plaintiff had exercised due diligence, she could have 
discovered the operative cause of her injury when she read a 
magazine article describing a woman with a cancer similar to 
her own whose mother took certain hormones during 
pregnancy and her doctor told her that the two were possibly 
related).    
In O‟Brien v. Eli Lilly, consistent with the principle 
articulated in other medical malpractice cases, we found that 
the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a 
jury to find that she could not reasonably have possessed the 
salient facts concerning the occurrence of her injury and who 
or what caused it since she was able to do so upon inquiring 
with her mother and her doctor two years later.   
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manifests itself, a plaintiff shall, under the rule, not be held 
responsible for knowing of the injury and/or its cause, thus 
triggering the statute of limitations.   
These principles are similarly applicable in the context 
of legal malpractice actions.  Both Pennsylvania courts and 
federal courts within this Circuit have recognized the 
discovery rule‟s application in legal malpractice matters.  In 
particular, the discovery rule has been applied in legal 
malpractice cases when the injured party is unable, despite 
the exercise of due diligence,
12
 to know of his injury or its 
cause.  See Bohus, 950 F.2d at 924.  These courts have 
applied the discovery rule where requiring a plaintiff‟s 
knowledge of his injury would otherwise be unreasonable.  
The effect is that the discovery rule tolls the running of the 
statute of limitations until a plaintiff is put in a position to 
discover the injury and its cause, either through inquiry or 
retention of a new lawyer.  Knowledge may also be imputed 
to plaintiffs when an adverse action is taken against them, be 
it through a court order or through a third party action, thus 
initiating the running of the statute of limitations at that time.   
Since this is a matter of state law, we look to 
Pennsylvania state courts initially.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the occurrence rule in 
deciding when the statute of limitations should begin to run in 
the criminal defense context of a plaintiff‟s claim of legal 
malpractice, but to our knowledge, has not yet analyzed the 
discovery rule‟s application to legal malpractice in a civil 
suit.  See Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. 1993) 
(“with regard to the respective statutes of limitations, the rule 
in this Commonwealth is that the statutory period commences 
at the time the harm is suffered or, if appropriate, at the time 
the alleged malpractice is discovered”) (citing Pocono, 468 
                                                 
12
 The terms “due diligence” and “reasonable diligence” are 
used by Pennsylvania courts in describing the requisite level 
of investigation necessary to prompt the start of the statute of 
limitations under the discovery rule.  Because neither term is 
material to our finding, we use the terms interchangeably.   
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A.2d at 471).
13
  However, one of Pennsylvania‟s intermediate 
appellate courts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, has 
analyzed the discovery rule in non-criminal legal malpractice 
contexts.  These rulings, along with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court‟s application in the medical malpractice 
context, are instructive in this context.  Spence, 623 F.3d at 
216.   
In Wachovia, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found 
that under the occurrence rule, plaintiff‟s legal malpractice 
and breach of contract causes of action against its attorney 
would have accrued at the time the attorney allegedly 
breached a duty owed when she failed to mark a judgment in 
a legal filing as “satisfied.”  935 A.2d at 574.  However, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the 
court assumed that plaintiff, despite the exercise of due 
diligence, could not have reasonably been aware of this 
alleged breach until a third party initiated proceedings against 
the plaintiff for damages.  The statute of limitations was 
therefore tolled from the time of the failure to mark the 
judgment until the third party‟s lawsuit against Wachovia two 
                                                 
13
 In Bailey, a consolidated appeal where plaintiffs brought 
malpractice actions against their trial attorneys after their 
direct appeals and other post-conviction efforts for relief were 
resolved, the court determined that the statute of limitations 
against a criminal defense attorney would not be tolled until 
the resolution of a plaintiff‟s appeal.  Id. at 116.   
Acknowledging that “the date a defendant becomes 
aware that his counsel may have been responsible for the 
harm will likely be harder to pinpoint,” the court decided that 
“[n]onetheless, it is necessary to establish a point from which 
the statute of limitations period will commence,” which it 
determined to be the end of the attorney-client relationship, 
since the aggrieved defendant would then  be “aware of the 
injury (i.e., the conviction), and . . . on clear notice to 
investigate any alternate cause of that harm which he believes 
to exist.”  Id.  In that regard, the court found “the defendant is 
not unlike the medical patient who becomes aware of an 
injury and is then placed on notice to discover its cause.”  Id.       
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years later, in which the damages regarding the failure to 
mark were asserted.  Plaintiff‟s delay in filing its malpractice 
claim until final resolution of the third party lawsuit nine 
years later was not excused by the discovery rule, because the 
plaintiff was reasonably aware of the malpractice when the 
third party claim was first filed.   
In Beausang, 839 A.2d at 437, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court affirmed the trial court‟s application of the 
discovery rule in delaying the start of the statute of limitations 
in a legal malpractice action.  The case involved a leasing 
company that retained defendant Butera, Beausang, Cohen & 
Brennan (“BBCB”), a law firm, to prepare an agreement of 
sale and deed in connection with plaintiff‟s purchase of office 
space from a condominium association.  The agreement of 
sale included language that parking spaces would be included 
in the sale, but the deed contained no such language.  Six 
years after the sale, a dispute arose between the plaintiff and 
the condominium association regarding the use of the parking 
spaces due to the lack of title transfer of the spaces.  The 
condominium association sent a letter to defendant BBCB 
accusing it of malpractice, a copy of which was sent to the 
plaintiff.   
At that time, plaintiff Glenbrook sought a second 
opinion from another firm which advised that Glenbrook may 
have a malpractice claim against BBCB.  Following a bench 
trial five years later in the action between Glenbrook and the 
condominium association, in which the court ruled in the 
condominium association‟s favor, Glenbrook filed suit 
against BBCB.  Glenbrook claimed that the two-year statute 
of limitations for malpractice should be tolled until the 
resolution of the bench trial.    
The superior court held that it would be unreasonable 
to expect the individuals that constituted the plaintiff, non-
attorneys, to learn of the injury of the firm‟s deficiency in the 
deed or the operation of the real estate doctrine of merger at 
the time that the sale occurred and the deed was conveyed to 
the plaintiff.  It made this finding notwithstanding the 
reference to the parking spaces in the agreement of sale.  The 
court found that the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the 
18 
 
harm—and the statute of limitations began to run—when the 
condominium association sent Glenbrook the copy of the 
letter to BBCB accusing BBCB of legal malpractice and 
Glenbrook sought a second legal opinion which confirmed 
that Glenbrook had a possible legal action against BBCB.
14
   
In Robbins, 674 A.2d 244, plaintiff medical 
corporation brought a legal malpractice action against its law 
firm, alleging negligence in its filing of an employee pension 
plan with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the statute of 
limitations did not accrue at the time of filing, but rather 
when the IRS, seven years later, notified the corporation that 
deductions for the pension plan were disallowed.
15
   
                                                 
14
 See also Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997) (affirming trial judge‟s refusal to grant relief on 
statute of limitations grounds because reasonable minds could 
differ about when the injury subsequent to the deficient 
drafting of stock purchase agreement actually happened, as 
between the initial drafting of the agreement, the first time the 
parties requested a decrease in monthly installments pursuant 
to the agreement, and the complete default in payment; 
reversing trial court‟s grant of motion for compulsory nonsuit 
because material fact questions existed); Garcia v. Cmty. 
Legal Servs. Corp., 524 A.2d 980, 985 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) 
(the court found that as a layperson, the plaintiff  “was 
reasonably unable to learn of her injury until the court 
notified her that her suit was dismissed.”).   
15
 See also ASTech Int‟l, LLC v. Husick, 676 F. Supp. 2d 389 
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (applying the discovery rule, the court found 
that plaintiffs should have known of their injury of lawyer‟s 
deficient patent filing and its cause no later than the date on 
which plaintiffs revoked defendant prior counsel‟s power of 
attorney and retained new counsel who had full access to 
information regarding status of both patent applications); 
Harsco Corp. v. Kerkam, Stowell, Kondracki & Clarke, P.C., 
961 F. Supp. 104 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (tolling statute of 
limitations under the discovery rule until condominium 
association notified plaintiff of problem in deed, not time of 
19 
 
The nettlesome issue is how to differentiate between 
instances when application of the discovery rule is 
appropriate or not.  Where “reasonable minds would not 
differ in finding that a party knew or should have known on 
the exercise of reasonable diligence of his injury and its 
cause,” Fine, 870 A.2d at 858-59, a court should determine, 
as a matter of law, that the discovery rule does not apply.  
“„[T]he point of time at which the injured party should 
reasonably be aware that he or she has suffered an injury is 
generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury. . . . 
Only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds 
cannot differ may the commencement of the limitation period 
be determined as a matter of law.”  Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta 
& Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Sadtler v. Jackson-Cross Co., 587 A.2d 727, 732 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991)).   
Reasonable diligence is an objective test, Kach v. 
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 642 n.17 (3d Cir. 2009), but it is also 
“sufficiently flexible to take into account the differences 
between persons and their capacity to meet certain situations 
and the circumstances confronting them at the time in 
question.”  Id. at 641 (quoting Miller, 463 F.3d at 276) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “[I]n this context, 
reasonable diligence is not an absolute standard, but is what is 
expected from a party who has been given reason to inform 
himself of the facts upon which his right to recovery is 
premised.”  Fine, 870 A.2d at 858.  Demonstrating the 
expected diligence requires a plaintiff to establish a display of 
“those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and 
judgment which society requires of its members for the 
protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”  
Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 363 n.6 (Pa. 2009) 
(citation omitted).  Although there are few facts which 
diligence cannot discover, there must be “some reason to 
awaken inquiry and direct diligence in the channel in which it 
would be successful.”  Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 
822 F.2d 1268, 1271 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Deemer v. 
                                                                                                             
sale when drafted under occurrence rule). 
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Weaver, 187 A. 215, 216 (Pa. 1936)); see also Debiec, 352 
F.3d 117.   
Where the plaintiff has no reason to investigate, the 
statute will be tolled.  Foulke, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (citing 
Sterling v. Stack & Gallagher, P.C., No. 97-CV-0297, 1998 
WL 84006, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1998)).  However, if 
something exists to trigger the inquiry, then the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he conducted an investigation, and despite 
doing so, did not discover his injury.  Id.      
Knopick argues that the statute of limitations for his 
malpractice action against the Connelly Defendants was 
tolled until, at the earliest, July 7, 2005, the date of the state 
court‟s order mandating relief to Dolly.  He contends that he 
did not discover his injury until after this date.  He believed 
everything had gone well at the hearing based on the 
Connelly Defendants‟ assurances, both immediately after the 
hearing and over the succeeding months.  Knopick did not 
believe that his agreement would be set aside.  Knopick 
argues that this state of affairs affected his ability to discover 
his injury and that, until the court‟s ruling,16 he believed that 
the Connelly Defendants had handled the hearing 
appropriately and that he would win.  Hence, he had no 
reason to engage in an inquiry or conduct further due 
diligence.   
                                                 
16
 In his brief, Knopick notes that he did not come to 
recognize that the Connelly Defendants had been negligent 
until he met with his new attorney.  We recognize that under 
Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs need not know that a defendant‟s 
negligence is the cause for injury before the limitations period 
begins to run.  All that is necessary is that they know that they 
have been injured and the cause of that injury.  Harsco, 961 F. 
Supp. at 108 (citing Navin v. Byrne, 638 F. Supp. 263, 264-
65 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (citing DeMartino v. Albert Einstein 
Med. Ctr., N. Dist., 460 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983))).  Here, it would appear that no mechanism or avenue 
of inquiry or due diligence existed for Knopick to know 
before the July 2005 order that he had been injured.   
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Knopick relies primarily on Fine, one of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s most recent iterations of the 
discovery rule, which is a consolidated medical malpractice 
case that involved a plaintiff‟s inability to discover his injury 
through due diligence.  In Fine, Defendant Dr. Checcio 
surgically extracted Fine‟s wisdom teeth.  Fine experienced 
symptoms including pain, bleeding, infection, swelling, and 
numbness on both sides of his face, but considered these 
conditions to be normal, based on advice from Dr. Checcio.  
All symptoms except the numbness subsided.  According to 
Fine, during his office visits with Dr. Checcio in the months 
that followed, Dr. Checcio repeatedly told Fine that it would 
take six months for the numbness to subside.  Some 
numbness still continued on the left side of his lip and chin.  
When his symptoms continued a year after the surgery, Fine 
came to believe that the persistent numbness was abnormal.   
Dr. Checcio moved for summary judgment based on 
the statute of limitations running from the time of the surgery, 
a motion the trial court denied without opinion.  The jury 
returned a verdict for Mr. Fine.  On appeal, Dr. Checcio 
argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for 
summary judgment.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed 
and reversed the judgment for Fine.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reversed the superior court, finding that the 
grant of summary judgment was improper.  Responding to 
Dr. Checcio‟s argument that the discovery rule did not apply 
as a matter of law because Fine was aware of the surgery and 
knew that his face was numb immediately after, the court 
found that, whether Fine should have known through 
reasonable diligence that his numbness could have been a 
temporary physical consequence of (and thus caused by) the 
procedure or a manifestation of his injury remained disputed.  
Fine, 870 A.2d at 861.  Thus, the supreme court concluded 
that issues of fact existed for resolution by the fact finder.
17
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 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also found that the 
superior court erred in holding that the statute was not tolled 
on grounds of fraudulent concealment because the parties 
disputed what the doctor actually said to Fine, and found that 
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Knopick argues that, as in Fine, a jury should decide 
whether a reasonable and diligent person should have 
immediately known that the failure to call witnesses at a 
hearing, in this context, was normal.  He claims that, as a lay 
person, he was unable to know and understand that he had 
suffered an injury prior to speaking with other counsel.
18
  
Knopick claims that he relaxed his vigilance, as did the 
plaintiff in Fine, who was similarly reassured by his doctor 
that his symptoms were normal.
19
   
                                                                                                             
the jury should decide whether this amounted to fraudulent 
concealment.    
18
 Downey emphasized at oral argument that Knopick, by 
virtue of his investments, was a sophisticated financial 
investor, and thus should have known of the alleged breach at 
the time of the hearing.  This argument is without merit.  The 
notion that a sophisticated investor is knowledgeable in all 
legal areas is not persuasive.  Knopick has no legal training.  
He relied on the Connelly Defendants.  There is no evidence 
in the record to conclude otherwise.   
19
 We also find instructive this Court‟s ruling in In re 
Mushroom Transportation  Co., Inc., 382 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 
2004) analyzing the Pennsylvania discovery rule, albeit in the 
context of a bankruptcy case.  In In re Mushroom 
Transportation Co., Inc., plaintiff‟s retained legal counsel to 
the bankruptcy estate embezzled funds from the estate.  The 
debtor, who did not have actual knowledge of the 
embezzlement while it was taking place, filed several claims 
against counsel and his law firm, among others, including 
breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful conversion, and 
negligence, on which the district court granted summary 
judgment for defendants because it found that the claims were 
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and laches 
under Pennsylvania law.   
On remand to the district court, we pointed to the 
Bankruptcy Code‟s encouragement that debtors-in-possession 
retain lawyers and noted that “the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship is relevant to a discovery rule analysis precisely 
23 
 
Downey insists that the statute of limitations began to 
run at the time of the PSA hearing on August 2, 2004, not 
when the court issued its July 7, 2005 order or sometime 
thereafter.  He claims that Knopick was fully aware of his 
alleged injury at the hearing when the Connelly defendants 
did not call the witnesses he suggested to testify.  He further 
claims in his brief in response, and at oral argument, that 
reliance on Pennsylvania medical malpractice cases is 
improper, because medical malpractice is treated differently 
than legal malpractice, but offers no meaningful support for 
that distinction.
20
   
Although we recognize that cases of medical 
malpractice require a different kind of trigger for a lay person 
to recognize an injury or its cause, and an injury‟s nature and 
manifestation will differ, this does not preclude reference to, 
or reliance on, the application of the discovery rule, in that 
context, in evaluating claims of legal malpractice.   
                                                                                                             
because it entails such a presumptive level of trust in the 
fiduciary by the principal that it may take a „smoking gun‟ to 
excite searching inquiry on the principal‟s part into its 
fiduciary‟s behavior.”  Id. at 343 (recognizing that the 
existence of a fiduciary, lawyer-client relationship and 
fiduciary‟s abuse of that relationship by themselves did not 
preclude judgment as a matter of law, but that “the presence 
of a fiduciary relationship would be pertinent to the question 
of when a plaintiff's duty to investigate arose.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gurfein v. Sovereign Grp., 
826 F. Supp. 890, 919 n.31 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).   
20
 Downey also claims that Fine is distinguishable because the 
statements made by the dentist to the plaintiff about his 
symptoms were in dispute, whereas here, the statements made 
by the Connelly Defendants are not.  Although the court in 
Fine did take this issue under consideration in finding that the 
lower court prematurely granted summary judgment, the 
more salient point here is that it is for a jury to determine 
whether Knopick was reasonably diligent in light of the 
undisputed statements.  
24 
 
The District Court below relied in part upon three 
district court decisions in deciding when the statute of 
limitations began to run at the time of the PSA hearing and 
not when Judge Morrow issued her order.  However, these 
cases did not address attorney assurances; instead they 
involved some adverse action or ruling made by the court 
against the plaintiff to trigger the plaintiff‟s awareness of 
injury and cause, or the alleged breach of duty (or the 
plaintiff‟s reaction to it) was obvious enough in nature to 
suggest that the plaintiff should have been aware of the 
complained-of injury and its cause.   
In the first, a district court found that the statute of 
limitations for malpractice, based on the attorney‟s failure to 
obtain an expert witness, failure to depose witnesses, and 
failure to represent plaintiffs‟ interests by demanding an 
additional $10,000, began on the day the plaintiffs received 
written notice from the attorney that the court had denied 
their motion to enlarge discovery to permit opinions of the 
expert and that they sought $10,000 to cover anticipated 
expenses.  Saferstein v. Paul, Mardinly, Durham, James, 
Flandreau & Rodgers, P.C., No. Civ. A 96-4488, 1997 WL 
102521, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1997), aff’d without opinion, 
127 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1997).   
In that case, the court‟s denial of counsel‟s motion for 
discovery disallowing the expert, a ruling against the plaintiff, 
and defendants‟ request for an additional $10,000 were 
apparently construed by the court as being indicative of 
potential malpractice at the time.  Although that case is not 
binding, we cannot find that the alleged conduct of 
malpractice in the instant case, as a matter of law, indicated 
injury or should have triggered investigation of injury to 
Knopick. 
The District Court relied on another unpublished 
decision, Carlise v. Bartony, Hare and Edson, No. Civ. 04-25, 
2006 WL 2226029, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2006), in which 
the court found that an attorney‟s withdrawal of two of 
plaintiff‟s claims during trial, and at a minimum the jury 
verdict, served as the start of the statute of limitations for 
plaintiff‟s claim of legal malpractice for: (1) his attorney‟s 
25 
 
failure to discover and introduce a deed solidifying his 
property rights; (2) withdrawal of the two claims; and (3) the 
low amount of damages verdict.  Though the court did not 
include the entire factual background or discuss alleged 
attorney assurances, it concluded that the plaintiff was fully 
aware of each of these failures when they happened.  The 
court discussed the discovery rule in finding that the plaintiff, 
at a minimum, was aware of the injuries and their cause as of 
the date the verdict was reached, though it did not save the 
late filing of his claim, more than five years after the jury 
verdict.   
Finally, the District Court cited to Pettit v. Smith, 241 
B.R. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1999).  There, the plaintiff asserted that 
the statute of limitations for her legal malpractice claim 
should commence when her wages were first garnished by the 
IRS based on tax returns she signed two years earlier.  She 
claimed that her attorneys failed to advise her that these were 
joint returns with her husband.  Although the factual 
recitation was brief, the court rejected that argument because 
it found that the plaintiff‟s deposition testimony and brief 
made clear that she knew or should have known when she 
signed income the tax returns prepared by her attorneys that 
they were being filed on behalf of herself and her husband.  
Id. at 851.  The court in Pettit also pointed to the plaintiff‟s 
conversation with an IRS agent at or around the same time 
and payment on the tax bill as evidence that she could have 
learned of her potential cause of action.  Finally, Pettit does 
not discuss attorney assurances.  The circumstances in the 
instant case do not support a grant of summary judgment 
against Knopick, as occurred in these three cases. 
Despite the fact that the injury in Fine, as a medical 
one, is distinguishable, the supreme court‟s approach there 
relies on the same principles for consideration of the 
discovery rule and is thereby instructive.  The act of 
malpractice Knopick now claims is the Connelly Defendants‟ 
failure to call witnesses at the hearing.  The approach in Fine, 
suggests we must address Knopick‟s ability, exercising 
reasonable diligence, to know of his subsequent injury and its 
cause.  See Fine, 870 A.2d at 861 (citing Pocono, 468 A.2d at 
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471).  A close look at the facts is necessary to the 
determination of this appeal.   
Of critical importance in this case is the distinction 
between the act constituting the alleged breach—the Connelly 
Defendants‟ failure to call witnesses, which would start the 
statute under the occurrence rule—and the injury that flowed 
from this failure, constructive knowledge of which would 
trigger the statute of limitations under the discovery rule.  The 
District Court, in applying the occurrence rule, conflated this 
distinction to some degree when it stated that plaintiff knew 
or should have known of “the alleged malpractice,” what it 
described as the Connelly Defendants‟ failure to call 
witnesses, as of the date of the hearing.  (App. at 11.) 
Although it is undisputed that Knopick knew the 
witnesses were not called, it remains in dispute, and a 
question which we believe a jury should decide, when 
Knopick knew that he was injured as a result of the witnesses 
not being called.  In this case, we believe the District Court 
inappropriately equates the breach of duty (or “alleged 
malpractice” action) with the injury suffered from that breach.   
Given the Pennsylvania courts‟ pronouncements of the 
discovery rule, as well as its application by federal courts 
within our Circuit, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that 
Knopick‟s injury, due to the failure to call witnesses, was 
readily ascertainable on the hearing date in light of his 
counsel‟s assurances that the witnesses were not necessary 
and that the hearing had gone well.  As in many of these 
cases, Knopick‟s attorney (in the underlying legal dispute) 
took an action he now claims was a breach of duty, the 
negative impact of which was not necessarily known to him 
until a later date. 
Beausang, Wachovia, and Robbins suggest that it 
would be inequitable to, in all cases, place the onus on a lay 
person to know that he has been injured by his counsel‟s 
decisions and start the running of the statute of limitations on 
his malpractice claim at that time.  These Pennsylvania 
Superior Court decisions in the first instance, in addition to 
Fine and its progeny, support an application of the discovery 
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rule.  Although the discovery rule has evolved in its 
application, its purpose has remained the same.  A plaintiff, 
unable to know of his injury or its cause because nothing has 
yet put him on notice of such injury, should not be held 
responsible for investigating until something gives him reason 
to do so.
21
     
It is undisputed that Knopick gave the Connelly 
Defendants a list of witnesses and discussed with counsel the 
topic of their proposed testimony, that Connelly represented 
that he would contact the witnesses, and that the issue to be 
decided at the hearing was whether Knopick had failed to 
make full and fair disclosure of his financial assets at the 
initial time of separation.  However, we find that reasonable 
minds could disagree in determining whether Knopick knew 
or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, of his alleged injury as early as August 2, 2004, the 
date of the hearing.  See Fine, 870 A.2d at 863 (citing 
Pocono, 468 A.2d at 471); see also Wilson, 964 A.2d at 363.  
Reasonable minds could disagree as to whether Knopick had 
the necessary clues that set off his obligation to investigate 
the implications of the Connelly Defendants‟ failure to call 
witnesses prior to the date of the court‟s July 7, 2005 order.  
Foulke, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 258.   
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 We also recognize that in many legal malpractice cases, a 
plaintiff will not, like Knopick, bear witness to, or have actual 
knowledge of, the act which he later alleges constitutes 
malpractice.  See, e.g., Robbins, 674 A.2d 244.  Here, 
although Knopick was present at the hearing when the 
witnesses were not called, we do not believe, viewing the 
facts in a light most favorable to Knopick, that witnessing this 
action, a seemingly strategic one made by his counsel, should 
have evoked or inspired knowledge imputed to Knopick, as a 
matter of law, that he was injured.   
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the district court erred in finding, as 
a matter of law, that the limitations period in Knopick‟s claim 
was triggered as of the August 2, 2004 state court hearing.  
Applying the discovery rule, we find that a jury could 
disagree as to whether Knopick reasonably knew or should 
have known of his injury before the court entered its order 
against Knopick on July 5, 2005.  We therefore find that the 
District Court erred in granting summary judgment in 
Downey‟s favor based on its application of the occurrence 
rule.  We will reverse the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment for Mr. Downey, and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
